Syllabus
Weeks 1-2
Basic concepts
(Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Joseph Levine)
Weeks 3-5
Brentano and neo-Brentanians
(Uriah Kriegel, Kriegel-Zahavi, Michelle Montague, Galen Strawson)
Weeks 6-8
Criticisms and revisions
(Marie Guillot, Salje & Geddes, Charles Siewert, Jakub Mihálik)
Weeks 9-11
Alternative theories of self-awareness
(Martine Nida-Rümelin, Joseph Levine, David Rosenthal, Sam Coleman)
Annotation
Zoom link: https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/96144259437
Philosophers often hold that consciousness, in addition to its qualitative features, is characterised by its subjectivity. Subjectivity in this sense has been described by Joseph Levine as ‘a way it’s like for me’, or simply ‘for-me-ness’. Conscious experience, then, according to this approach, essentially makes us aware of itself, which means that it involves a form of ‘self-awareness’. Such a view of subjectivity, famously held by Brentano, has recently undergone a revival, associated with authors such as Uriah Kriegel, Dan Zahavi and Michelle Montague. Our course will focus on various approaches to self-awareness in current analytic philosophy. It will also look at their inspiration in continental philosophy as well as the influence of cognitive psychology. We will, moreover, track the implications of one’s understanding of self-awareness for metaphysical theories of consciousness, such as representationalism, Russellian monism, and physicalism. This course is a Masters’ course and a basic acquaintance with philosophy of mind will be an advantage.