Syllabus
The following will be among the central themes of the course:
1. The views of Charles Darwin on the mind and evolution, and his differences on this issue with Alfred Russel Wallace.
2. Teleological theories of evolutionary development in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
3. The twentieth century neo-Darwin synthesis and its implications for evolution of mind.
4. Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett: mechanistic theories of the evolution of mind.
5. Thomas Nagel, Jerry Fodor, Piattelli-Palmarini: Doubts about the mechanistic explanation.
6. Panpychism and emergence.
7. The problem of epistemic boundedness for evolutionary theory of mind: Charles Pierce, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Alvin Plantinga.
8. Is intelligent design really an alternative?
Annotation
This course aims to address two questions that concern mind in evolutionary theory:
(i) The first question is how mind can emerge from an evolutionary process that begins from beings quite lacking in mind and consciousness. We will examine different approaches to this question, varying from the purely mechanistic accounts of Dennett and Dawkins, to accounts that are sceptical of materialism, including those of Chomsky, Nagel, and Fodor. We will also look at panpsychist and emergentist accounts of the origin of mind.
(ii) Secondly, we will concern ourselves with the question of what cognitive abilities may be attributed to a mind that arises in the process of evolution. We will be attentive to the requirement of any theory of evolution that it must be able to explain our cognitive grasp of its own truth, and we will assess different accounts of how this is possible.
This is a course in the philosophy of mind. It will assume no background in evolutionary theory. While it will certainly help to have some background in philosophy of mind, epistemology and the philosophy of science, students who are beginners in philosophy are also welcome.