Syllabus
Britain and the European Union
Module leader: Alistair Jones
Email: anjones@dmu.ac.uk
Twitter: @dmuanjones
Programme Overview
Workshop 1 - Introduction
Workshop 2 - Britain and Europe, 1945-1970
Workshop 3 - Britain and Europe, 1970-1990
Workshop 4 - Britain and Europe, post-1990
Workshop 5 - Europeanisation
Workshop 6 - British Political Parties and the EU
Workshop 7 - The British media, public opinion and the EU
Workshop 8 - British Euroscepticism
Workshop 9 - Brexit or Bremain?
Workshop 10 - A Europe without the UK?
Debate 1 - Should Britain have joined the then-EEC?
Debate 2 - Is there a future for Britain in the EU?
Readings/Sources
Bache, I.; George, S. & Bulmer, S (2009); Politics in the European Union (2011, 3rd edition)
Blair, A. (2010); The European Union since 1945 (Longman)
Childs, D. (2006); Britain since 1945, (Routledge, 6th edition)
Crowson, N. (2011); Britain and Europe: A Political History (Routledge)
Dinan, D. (2014); Europe Recast: A History of the European Union (Palgrave, 2nd edition)
Dinan, D. (2010); Ever Closer Union (Palgrave, 4th edition)
Dumbrell, J.(2006); A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (Palgrave, 2nd edition)
Gamble, A. (2006); Between Europe and America: the future of British Politics (Palgrave)
Geddes, A. (2013); Britain and the European Union (Palgrave)
George, S. (1992); Britain and the European Community: the politics of semi-detachment (Clarendon Press)
Gowland, T., Turner, A. & Wright, A (2010); Britain and European Integration since 1945 (Routledge)
Hennessy, P. (2000); The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (Allen Lane)
Jones, A. (2016); Britain and the European Union (Edinburgh University Press, 2nd edition)
McCormick, J. (2014); Understanding the European Union (Palgrave, 6th edition)
Nugent, N. (2010); The Government and Politics of the European Union (Palgrave, 7th edition)
Reynolds, D. (2000);Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Powers in the Twentieth Century (Longman, 2nd edition)
Sanders, D. (1990); Losing an Empire - Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (Macmillan)
Young, H. (1998); This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (Overlook Press)
Young, J. (2000); Britain and European Unity, 1945-99 (Macmillan)
Workshop 1 - Introduction
This introductory tutorial provides an opportunity for you meet your tutor and discuss any questions that you might have from the reading list. There will also be an opportunity to examine some of the issues to be covered in future tutorials, as well as in the debates. The session will finally finish with a discussion on the nature of Britain’s relationship with the EU and you will have an opportunity to provide a list of the positive and negative aspects of British participation. Comparisons may be made with the relationship between the EU and other member states.
Workshop 2 - British and Europe, 1945-1970
Introduction
A common theme running through accounts of British foreign policy in the post-1945 era has been the way in which successive governments have sought to balance Britain’s declining economic and political influence with maintaining the country as a key strategic player in world politics. At the end of the Second World War, Britain was a nation that had remained undefeated and was the only major power to fought for the duration of the war. Victory brought much to be proud of. Britain could claim to have an Empire and significant economic, political and military influence that would support the notion of it being a great power. In 1945 Britain had a military presence in over 40 countries in nearly every corner of the globe, from Austria to Aden, Burma to Bermuda and Egypt to Ethiopia. But the demands and obligations that came from a desire to maintain a ‘Great Power’ status meant the country faced numerous problems. The economy was in poor shape, with financial resources exhausted by the war effort. The leading economist of the day, Lord Keynes, noted in a Cabinet memorandum of 13 August 1945 that the country faced a ‘financial Dunkirk’.
Although industry suffered from poor competitiveness when compared to newly industrialising countries that utilised the latest methods of production, Britain was still able by virtue of its position to be a significant base of production. Yet the signs of decline were already there. Industry suffered from poor management who showed a disdain for the latest methods of management practices and a workforce that was overly protected by trade unions that often failed to grasp the need to adopt differing working practices. In time this would be referred to as the ‘British disease’, denoting the inefficient working practices that brought British industry to its knees in the late 1960s and 1970s and which would be reflected in the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Britain declining from a position of seventh in the world in 1950 to eighteenth by 1970. But despite the dramatic nature of this decline, in the post-war years many were oblivious that Britain’s place in the world was not assured and that it had a number of key challenges.
British economic policy after the Second World War was one of considerable contradictions. On the one hand, Britain was a bankrupt nation. Yet rather than a complete collapse, the British economy actually expanded after the Second World War. Exports quadrupled between 1944 and 1950. In 1950 Britain accounted for some 25 per cent of total manufacturing exports in comparison to Germany, which had 7 per cent. A few years later in 1957, Britain had around 17 per cent of world manufacturing exports. And while this was a noticeable decline on only a few years earlier, it was a figure that was still considerably higher than the likes of France and Japan. Such a position would lead to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan commenting in 1957 that ‘most Britain’s have never had it so good’. A decade later in 1967 Wilson would reflect that a ‘white heat of technology’ was revolutionising Britain’s competitiveness in science and technology. Yet while there were some truths to these phrases, most notably evidenced by the development of the Franco-British designed supersonic aircraft Concorde which flew for the first time in 1969, the reality was that Britain’s position in the world economy was declining relative to that of others. Whereas in 1960 Britain’s share of world trade was around 16 per cent and Germany’s 19 per cent, the following decade would see Germany’s proportion of trade at the global level increase to 20 per cent while Britain’s fell to 10 per cent. On the one hand, the fact that as a small island nation Britain could still account in 1970 for a tenth of all global trade was clearly a remarkable achievement. But this also highlighted that the British economy had fallen off a cliff in every sense, from having had one quarter of a total value of manufacturing exports in 1950. For some observers this reduction from 25 per cent to 10 per cent in a period of two decades was in every sense a disaster.
Britain also faced pressures for independence in the colonies and the mandated territories that had been acquired after 1920. The issue was not whether change was likely, but rather the nature and timing of that change. Yet the implications of any withdrawal from Empire were massive, most notably in relation to trade and