Sylabus
Day 1 (19 April 2023): Introducing IO blame games
Part 1: How the politicization of IOs drives IO blame games What are IO blame games and why do we see them?
• Louis, M., & Maertens, L. (2021). Why international organizations hate politics. Routledge. Chapter 6. (open access)
• Schimmelfennig, F. (2020). Politicisation management in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(3), 342–361. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1712458.
Part 2: Varieties of IO blame games Is there a single IO blame game or multiple IO blame games?
• Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., Rittberger, B. & Zangl, B. (2023). Varieties of European Blame Games: On Scapegoat, Renegade, and Diffusion Games. In: Dimova, G., Flinders, M., Hinterleitner, M., Rhodes, R. A. W., & Weaver, K. (ed.) The Politics and Governance of Blame. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.
• Schlipphak, B., & Treib, O. (2017). Playing the blame game on Brussels: The domestic political effects of EU interventions against democratic backsliding. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(3), 352–365. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1229359.
Day 2 (20 April 2023): The players of IO blame games
Part 1: National governments and opposition parties When and how do governments use IOs to avoid blame?
• Novak, S. (2013). The silence of ministers: Consensus and blame avoidance in the council of the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), 1091–1107. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12063
• Traber, D., Schoonvelde, M., & Schumacher, G. (2019). Errors have been made, others will be blamed: Issue engagement and blame shifting in prime minister speeches during the economic crisis in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 59(1), 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12340.
Part 2: IO bureaucracies Are IOs passive scapegoats or active blame avoiders?
• Capelos, T., & Wurzer, J. (2009). United Front: Blame Management and Scandal Response Tactics of the United Nations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17(2), 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.2009.00567.x.
• Heinkelmann-Wild, T., & Zangl, B. (2020). Multilevel blame games: Blame-shifting in the European Union. Governance, 33(4), 953–969. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12459.
Day 3 (21 April 2023): The rules and consequences of IO blame games
The rules of the game: Clarity of responsibility and IO authority When do blame generation and blame avoidance strategies succeed or fail? What blame games stick?
• Rittberger, B., Schwarzenbeck, H., & Zangl, B. (2017). Where does the buck stop? Responsibility attributions in complex international institutions. Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(4), 909–924. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12524.
• Wilson, T.L., & Hobolt, S.B. (2015). Allocating responsibility in multilevel government systems: Voter and expert attributions in the European Union. The Journal of Politics, 77(1), 102–113. https://doi.org/10.1086/678309.
The consequences of IO blame games: Public opinion and accountability Do IO blame games contribute to or inhibit accountability?
• Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., Rittberger, B. & Zangl, B. (2023). Blame Shifting and Blame Obfuscation: The Blame Avoidance Effects of Delegation in the EU. European Journal of Political Research, 62(1), 221–238. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12503.
• Hobolt, S.B., & Tilley, J. (2014). Blaming Europe? Responsibility without accountability in the European Union. Oxford University Press. Chapter 8.
Anotace
This is a guest course taught by Tim Heinkelmann-Wild from the Ludwig Maximilian University Munich, on April 19-21, 2023.
International organizations (IOs), such as the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Health Organization (WHO), are increasingly contested. Their politicization has increased public attention to IO policies and, in particular, IO policy failures, thus incentivizing political actors at both the national and international level to engage in blame games. For instance, the EU is criticized for failing to adequately respond to Russia’s invasion in the Ukraine, the IMF is frequently blamed for welfare cuts in lending countries, and the WHO was made responsible by US President Donald Trump for his countries’ struggle in responding to COVID-19. IO blame games matter because they impact not only the accountability of policymaking in IOs but also their public support. This seminar introduces the phenomenon of IO blame games as well as their drivers and consequences: How do IO blame games differ from domestic blame games? What are the rules of IO blame games? Who are the players of IO blame games and what are their goals and strategies? When do these strategies succeed or fail? And what are the consequences of IO blame games? By discussing these questions, we will jointly develop an analytical perspective that allows for a better understanding of the public controversies surrounding IO policymaking.