Publikace na Fakulta sociálních věd, Matematicko-fyzikální fakulta, Centrum pro ekonomický výzkum a doktorské studium |
2010
Abstrakt
The standard price competition of two or more players leads to Bertrand equilibrium in basic economic theory. I follow the literature that originated with Varian's (1980) model, especially Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and analyze oligopolistic markets where buyers have reservation values drawn from a common distribution function rather than a single value (inelastic demand), as typically assumed in the models of Varian's or Kocas and Kiyak's type.
The model presented in this paper is developed from the simplest symmetric set-up (uninformed buyers are assigned to sellers evenly) to the most complex asymmetric set-up with many competing sellers (uninformed buyers are distributed over sellers unevenly).