Abstract
The text provides an Aristotelian-inspired argument against the thesis that particulars do not have any (non-trivial) de re necessary properties. This anti-essentialist claim is addressed in the form it takes within the implicit ontology of the Transparent Inten-sional Logic (TIL) of Pavel Tichý, the most developed logical formalism based on Fregean fundaments up to date.
The author sets out to show that given the reality of "accidental change" (or any contingent variation across time or possible worlds), there must be tropes or particular accidental forms - quite irrespectively of any assumptions concerning the nature of universals. Since the tropes must ultimately differ essentially, it follows that there are many essentially distinct natural kinds of particulars, so that insistence on essential sameness of substances turns out as unwarranted.
The article concludes with some general thoughts concerning the relationship between ontology and logic. The author defends the view that our ontology should not be tailored to fit the expressive and demonstrative powers of a pragmatically chosen logical formalism, but precisely the other way around.