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Political economy of decision making in the EU: coalition formation in the European Parliament

Publikace na Fakulta sociálních věd |
2012

Tento text není v aktuálním jazyce dostupný. Zobrazuje se verze "en".Abstrakt

In this paper we address the following question: Taking as decisional units national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of "national" coordination of voting and in the case of "partisan" coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step there is an internal voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there is a voting of aggregated groups (European political parties of national representations) in the EP. In the both cases the voting has and ideological dimension (elementary unit is a party), difference is only in dimension of aggregation.

Power indices methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups in the cases of partisan and national coordination of voting behaviour.