Abstract
This paper introduces the formal institutional arrangement of the Czech government advisory councils and committees (hereinafter committees). Guidelines and legal framework of the committees are discussed in the context of theories of democracy and policy-making.
Government advisory committees in the Czech governmental system are set up by the members of the government primarily to provide the government with expert advises in various public policies (energy policy, health policy, minorities, etc.). They are constituted from diverse numbers of representatives of government (politicians), bureaucrats, representatives of various public and private institutions and appointed “independent” experts.
The paper draws on the idea that there is more than just one legitimate way in which the government can set up its advisory bodies. I argue that on the formal level specific role of the advisory committees in the Czech Republic has never been conclusively defined by the government.
Moreover, even if we consider different possible purposes of these institutions and different possible roles (meaning both adversarial and deliberative ones), the formal procedures governing their operations seem to comprise several internal paradoxes especially with regards to the relations between the membership basis and the forms of decision-making (voting). Based on the analysis of the legal committee framework and guidelines, I draw several ideas for further empirical research mainly focused on the relationship between formal and informal role of the committee, the ways in which the rules are experienced by the members and the influence of the rules over the nature of advices produces by the committees.