Abstract
The multiple-relation theory of judgement was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1910 as the upshot of a critique of propositional realism which, in revolt against idealism, he took over from G. E.
Moore. The target of the critique is founded on a binary theory of judgement.
Russell attacks the binary theory indirectly by a critique of the identity theory of truth which goes hand in hand with this conception of judgement. In the first part I interpret this critique and then, in the part that follows, I present the multiple-relation theory.
In the remainder of the piece I will consider the question of which theory of truth adoption of the multiple-relation theory leads us to. I will also address the question of whether this theory avoids the problems of the binary theory of judgement.
In answer to the first of these questions I propose, in the third part, the contextual theory of truth. I will defend this proposal against the thesis that it is actually a congruent version of the correspondence theory.
As I will argue in the fourth part, those passages where Russell speaks of correspondence should be treated with caution – in fact, these passages should be positively disregarded. In conclusion I return to the multiple-relation theory as such, and I indicate the difficulty which arises when, in the framework of this theory, we seek to make sense of the synthetic unity of judgement.