Abstract
The article deals with budgetary constraints currently being constitutionalized in the EU countries, also as a result of the European Fiscal Compact. The main thesis is that these constraints are a desirable and effective institution, if set correctly.
The first part of the text examines the parliamentary power to approve the budget. It argues that its restrictions to protect the public finance sustainability are not only permissible in a democratic state, but even support the original purpose for which the power was entrusted to parliament.
The next part describes various types of numerical and institutional budgetary rules and evaluates them on the basis of their efficiency and counter-cyclical nature. It concludes that the best model is a combination of a numerical rule limiting structural deficit with an independent advisory fiscal council.
The council's opinions and recommendations on fiscal policy are to support collective enforcement of the numerical rule by voters and actors of financial market. The overall purpose of the rules must be a support rather than replacement of political process in fiscal issues.
The last part of the article discusses recent legislative proposals that were proposed in the Czech Republic and suggests certain changes.