Abstract
The aim of my dissertation thesis is to survey the special and problematic place granted to aesthetic value in two most comprehensive attempts at general naturalistic theory of value in the 20th century: Ralph B. Perry's General Theory of Value (1926) and Stephen C.
Pepper's The Sources of Value (1958). As Perry defines value in terms of interest and Pepper in terms of purposive behaviour, the crucial question I pose is: What marks an interest as aesthetic, or what is the purpose of aesthetic reception? Since Perry's treatment of aesthetic issues is admittedly underdeveloped, I invite writings on aesthetic valuation of Perry's associate and follower David W.
Prall to elaborate on the interest-based account. In the first chapter, underlying philosophical and scientific coThe aim of my dissertation thesis is to survey the special and problematic place granted to aesthetic value in two most comprehensive attempts at general naturalistic theory of value in the 20th century: Ralph B.
Perry's General Theory of Value (1926) and Stephen C. Pepper's The Sources of Value (1958).
As Perry defines value in terms of interest and Pepper in terms of purposive behaviour, the crucial question I pose is: What marks an interest as aesthetic, or what is the purpose of aesthetic reception? Since Perry's treatment of aesthetic issues is admittedly underdeveloped, I invite writings on aesthetic valuation of Perry's associate and follower David W. Prall to elaborate on the interest-based account.n with writings of Prall.