Abstrakt
The presented study focuses on analysis of a sample of public contracts for construction works, performed on data from the Information System of Public Procurement (TSVZ). The initial idea is a so-called effect of non-transparency.
We assume that with a diminishing transparency of public procurement, there increases the likelihood that public contracts will he overpriced. One of the attributes of transparency is the ability to trace the ultimate owner of the company (Beneficial Owner) carrying out the given public contract.
We start from a rational assumption that if it is possible to trace the ultimate owner, such implementer of a public procurement is then relatively easily checked by the public in that it is known its ownership structure. Research results indicate that if it was possible to trace the ultimate owner of the company carrying out implementation of the public contract, these contracts have in turn the lowest degree of overpricing.
Contrariwise, the highest degree of overpricing (the difference between the final and initial prices at almost 100,1,0) represented contracts implemented by subjects that cannot he traced from public information sources. Companies owned by foreign subjects (mainly large international concerns) are doing slightly worse than implementing subjects with good traceability (natural persons) and much better than non-transparent subjects for which it is not possible to trace the ultimate owner.