Abstrakt
Recommending that one treat propositions as incomplete symbols, Russell departed from his earlier theory about propositions in 1910. According to one frequently endorsed interpretation, he maintained that ontological commitments to false propositions as objective entities cannot be reconciled with the associated theory of propositional unity.
I explain that the versions of this interpretation in Sainsbury (1979) and Linsky (1993, 1999) are incorrect from exegetical reasons. The objection they ascribe to later Russell is based on the so-called 'unity argument'.
I also argue against Weiss (1995) and Lebens (2009) who endorse the unity argument independently on exegesis of Russell's texts. In the course of my argument, I outline Russell's primitivist views about unity and truth.
I elaborate on his theory of unity and develop a sort of redundancy account of unity which I consider to be a correct answer to the problem of unity inherited from Bradley-Russell dispute.