Electoral Design and Engineering as a Part of Decentralized Governance: A Lesson from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Abstrakt

Electoral design and electoral engineering can be researched besides the other approaches also as a standard part of the governance process. Electoral design and engineering are usually a part of the central government or more precisely central parliament decision-making.

This paper tries to show that electoral design set up exclusively by the lower level authorities can be a serious threat to the stability and integrity of the state. The topic is examined in the case of the first direct elections within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which took place in 1990.

The elections occurred solely on the level of the constituent republics. The choice of electoral system and timing of the elections had been left up to the authorities of the republics.

That enabled the strengthening of power and legitimacy of the republics institutions and elites and vice versa the weakening of the federal ones. Therefore, the elections were one of the key elements of the dissolution of multinational Yugoslav state.

The topic is examined primarily through the standard qualitative and partly also quantitative comparative methodology and can be classified as a contribution in the field comparative politics and the subfield of electoral studies. The findings of the paper can be used not only in a further theoretical research of governance and electoral studies, but also in practical policy-making strategies in the states with divided society.