Abstrakt
The US government recently issued a moratorium on so called ""gain-of-functions research"", which aims to advance specific functions of pathogens and provide thus a better ground for medical research on deadly viruses. This moratorium was declared against the background of rising efforts to address biological threats and risks and regulate dual-use research in life sciences.
Intrigued by this new type of science-security nexus, this paper seeks to briefly historicise and conceptualise the notion of dual-use and then critically reflect on the contemporary understanding and regulation of dual-use research in biosciences. After scrutinising the notion of dual-use research and touching upon the broader societal context in which this concept is embedded, the paper focuses on this problem in life sciences.
It discusses the expanding notion of bio-weapons and the emergence new approaches to address contemporary biological threats and the threat of bioterrorism in particular. Based on this analysis, the paper concludes that the new understanding and governance of dual-use research brings about not only new conceptualisation of threat subjects (such as technology and knowledge) and security referents, but also reinforces the rise of regulatory practices that blur the boundary between scientific and security expertise.