Abstrakt
In the early 1950's Howard Raiffa proposed (independently of John Nash and almost simultaneously) several solutions (different from that of Nash) to the two-player bargaining game (S,d) where S is a subset of two-dimensional euclidean space and d is a point in S. The elements of S are usually interpreted as the utility pairs that the players can obtain by reaching a unanimous agreement on the choice of an element of S, and d as the outcome when the players reach no agreement.
Until recently, the Raiffa solutions, their modifications and extensions to other domains received significantly less attention that the classical Nash solution. There are two basic approaches to solving bargaining problems: strategic and axiomatic.
In this paper, I attempt to provide a brief survey of recent results on the axiomatic approach to the discrete Raiffa solution. Moreover, I discuss some modifications of this solution, and try to identify promising directions for further research.