Abstract
This study discusses the limits of Marx's reinterpretation of Hegel's conception of dialectics as a self-mediation of the fundamental by way of historical reality: we will show Marx's disessentialisation of the (already quite monistic) Hegelian absolute spirit, and the consequences of Marx's conception of consciousness as of a conscious being for the concept of culture, reduced that is to interest-conditioned, ""ideological"" praxis and its self-reflection. The study thus subjects to criticism the reduction of objectivi-ty to totality in György Lukács, the founder of modern western Marxism; it points to the residuum (in no way objectively unlicensed) of self-positing subjecti-vism in his ""class-consciousness""; and it compares this immanentist conception with, on the one hand, the utopian conception of Ernst Bloch, foreshadowing Derrida's stress on the auto-criti-cism of Marxism as a philosophy of the historicity of categories (as Lukács himself theo-retically understood it!), and, on the other hand, with the dialectical non-identity of the possible of Theodor W.
Adorno. By reflecting on Marx's concept of (historical) consciousness (of conscious Being) through critical insight into its most (in our view) significant interpretations of the 20th century, the study attempts to capture the limi-ts of the monistically-conceived dialectic for democratic social pra-xis, preserving the ""principle of hope"" in the openness of the unsubsumable individual.