Tracing Heidegger's Basic Steps in His Reinterpretation of the Subject-Object Relation from Husserl's Explanation of the Basic Structure of Intentional Acts
2016
Abstract
This study investigates Heidegger's untraditional explanation of the subject-object relation. It is shown that Heidegger is initially inspired by Husserl's exposition of the structure of intentional act.
The two basic structural points of intentional acts - the intention and what is sensually given - are strongly present in the background of Heidegger's exposition of the thing (das Ding). The meaning of thing is arising from the "what for" and therefore "like what" it is accessible to us.
By this, the thing refers to the overall continuity of the world which is then significant as a basic horizon of the meaning of the connection between the human and the thing - and not of the subject and object.