Abstract
In this article Janeček deals with the theory of fictionalism concerning particularly morality and law. In the beginning author makes explicit the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.
Then he shows in the domain of morality what could be the deficiencies of these two theories. He argues that this possible weakness is caused by insufficient analyses of mo-rality.
The nature of morality, as much as the nature of law, is in fact ambiguous and this fea-ture, given that our metaethical theory is to be taken seriously, leads us to fictionalism. The fact that fictionalism, as a distinctive theoretical stance, has its historical precedents supports our intuitions in favor of this theory.
Janeček first examines moral fictionalism which is to be understood as so called noncognitive factualism. He explains the fundamental notion of fic-tionalism - acceptance.
In the following passage we will see the analogy between morality and law which leads us to legal fictionalism. There are three levels of legal fictions distinguished in this article.
On the first level we focus on fictive legal concepts such as legal person. On the second level we deal with mostly technical constructions of legal fiction such as fiction of service.
And on the third level we concern the fiction of normativity. Author purports that we can get a valuable insight to the problem of clarity of legal language through the fictionalist approach.
On the level of normativity he also argues that the dispute between legal positivism and naturalism, interpreted in terms of fictionalism, turns out to be less compelling.