Abstract
This article aims to clarify the approach of contemporary Kantian moral theories to the emotions. The emotions are often presented as the biggest problem for this type of ethical reflection.
One of the standard interpretations of Kant claims that, on his view, emotions are excluded from morally-worthwhile conduct. Our conduct should flow from pure duty, in the absence of affective inclination.
In the first part of the article we show that this interpretation of Kant is not the only one possible and that, in his view, emotions may accompany morally-worthwhile conduct. The theories of contemporary Kantians (Korsgaard, Hermanová) confirm this.
The role of emotions in Kantian theories is, however, limited. The emotions cannot play an active role in the determination of the moral worth of human conduct.
A "expanded" Kantian morality which asserts such a role for emotions (such as is attempted by Ernst Tugendhat) cannot be given argumentational support and is bound to fail. In the concluding part of the article we show that this failure is in no way philosophically problematic and that emotions should not enter into the normative evaluation of human conduct.