Abstract
The aim of this article is to elucidate the conception of a person as a point of imputation. To be a person in law, in this perspective, means to be "a kind of point" to which one can impute rights and duties.
What makes a person a point of imputation is, in the author's view, the concept of "imputability". From this perspective the imputability also is identical with the legal personality or personhood.
However, the person is not just a static point of imputation of some existing rights and duties. It is also and foremost an entity which causes the creation of legal duties.
It follows that a person cannot be understood only as the personification of the existing duties and rights but, from a dynamic point of view, one should impute a right to create these rights and duties to this person as well. This dynamics, however, cannot be caused by the mere fact that the person theoretically has this "competence" (i.e. the person is entitled to create rights and duties) but also by the fact that one can impute an intellect and will to it.
In this respect we must impute four qualities to a person in law: i. intellect and will, ii. right to impose a duty on another person, iii. right to ask for an enforcement of an existing duty (i.e. to have a claim-right) iv. obligation to fulfill an existing duty (i.e. to have a duty).