Abstrakt
The article deals with an empiric analysis of behavior of contracting authorities when tendering public contracts in the context of theories dealing with rational, imperfectly rational and rationally inattentive behavior of agents, it tries to describe the problem of avoiding risk by the contracting authorities in further detail. In this case, the authors try to fill the gap using an empiric analysis where it is worked with real data of public contracts form 2010-2014.
We can consider the main findings to the fact that public contracting authorities prefer strategies that are based on a reduction of risk of conflicts with regulator.These strategies are chosen mainly based on signals of behavior of central authorities, rather than based on the effort of gaining the most informative stratégy. However, the final results is the same.
In the authrs opinion, the aversion to risk by the contracting authorities, which is ebfirced by the public policy in this field, plays the major role.