Abstrakt
Reflecting on the V4 transition experience, the paper pleads for a strong developmental state in future transition cases. By a strong state, it understands a form of state which sustains relative autonomy (of its formal institutions) against both the internal informal sector of crony networks (including 'red directors') and the external pressures of powerful global actors (such as transnational companies).
This also means a form of state whose strategic intervention is not based on partial reforms but industrial policies oriented on improving endogenous factors of national competitiveness. From this point of view, Visegrád states have proved to be ambivalent transition cases of both success and failure.
In contrast to other postsocialist transition economies, Visegrád states have remained resilient, while their economies showed signs of a slight successful catch-up with 'advanced' economies in Western Europe. In comparison to these 'advanced' economies and actually the South Korean developmental experience, Visegrád states have however proved to be weak and able to preserve neither internal, nor external relative autonomy.
This have brought rather negative developmental consequences, namely the formation of dual economies where the (i) domestic sector is often dominated by unproductive oligarchs or subcontracting manufacturing firms with rather exceptional cases of global success, while the much more robust (ii) foreign-owned sector is powerfully shaping the future economic fortunes of Visegrád populations.