Abstrakt
This paper is concerned with examination of Peirce's so-called proofs of symbolization, i.e. an argument by which he aims to show the grounds of possibility of the three species of inference, deduction, hypothesis, and induction. After clarifying the exact subject of the argument (1), I turn to the discussion of its two premisses, i.e. that the three species of inference are distinct and each must supply its own ground of proof (2), and that there is one kind of object corresponding to each inference (3).
After that I turn to the exposition of Peirce's proofs of the principles for deduction, induction, and hypothesis (4). I conclude (5) that by this argument Peirce is able to explain generic unity and specific differences of inference founded upon the concept of symbolization and by interpreting Peirce's argument as transcendental, since its aim is to give explanatory account of the conditions making experience possible.