Abstract
The discussion about influence of PC algorithms on the theory and practice of competition (anti-cartel) law has its practical justification. PC algorithms enable the processing of such a volume of data, plus a very quick and lasting, non-emotional reaction, that the underlying assumptions on which competition protection has so far been built cease to work.
Transparency of markets ceases to foster competition and the market can be riddled of price competition without any hint of contact or agreement that is currently considered as a cartel. The possibility of suppressing price competition in online trading markets cannot but provoke a reaction of the current competition law.
The paper thus attempts to analyze this issue through a review of the ongoing debate. It provides information on where the current and future threats to competition are seen today and what recipes to tackle them are presented.
It looks in a critical manner at the instruments that the current competition law can use for this purpose. It focuses exclusively on the question of pricing made by computer algorithms, which may or may not fulfil the present definition of a cartel.
The issue of abuse of a dominant position is paid attention only when it is relevant to deal with price collusion on oligopolistic markets.