Abstrakt
The paper analyses the fiscal stability rules in Europe on the basis of three evaluation criteria. The first criterion is effectiveness, meaning a degree of probability that the budget rules are going to have a positive influence on the public finances development, which is closely connected with their enforcement mechanisms.
The second criterion is their democratic legitimacy and compatibility with a classical notion of parliamentarianism which considers the "power of the purse" to be one of the very basic powers of parliament. The third criterion is their flexibility in relation to the economic cycle, in particular whether they have either pro-cyclical or countercyclical design.
It argues that the fiscal stability rules, if properly designed, are both reconcilable with democratic parliamentarianism and likely to achieve their goals. First, it discusses the budgetary powers of parliament: how they have emerged, what is their rationale, whether they meet it, and to what extent they may be subject to limitations.
Then it moves to fiscal stability rules: explains various types and specific features thereof, such as various fiscal performance indicators (e.g. debt, deficit, current expenses) which may be used as the criterion and the methods of enforcement. Besides, it discusses their effectiveness, based on past empirical studies.
Finally, it conclude that some of the constitutional provisions adopted meet the requirements, but other do not: we may all speak German, but not always we understand what we are saying.