Abstract
The chapter deals with the burden of proof that has its origin as a legal concept in civil proceedings, in which it is an inherent element of the so-called adversarial proceedings. This term has also begun to be used in the area of criminal law, even though its meaning is still gradually being watered down (particularly in respect of the so-called burden of proof in the material meaning) and even more significantly than in case of the civil proceedings doctrine.
In the text, there is primarily presented the fact that, even today, an interest in the matter of the so-called burden of proof has lost none of its relevance, since from 1967, when this matter was in an excellent way elaborated by professor Antonín Růžek, there have been significant changes that interfere with the presumption of innocence principle and the rule that in the course of criminal proceedings, there cannot be any situation where the accused person shall be obliged to prove anything. The author expresses the opinion that, however, a concept of burden of proof has to be viewed even in a different meaning than before (formal vs. material burden of proof), which shall be free from the criterion of particular party's interests and better reflect an approach in the case-law of courts designated for the protection of basic human rights and freedoms.