Abstrakt
My aim in this paper is to give account of Peirce's Semiotic from the perspective of its origins. That is, I address two following questions: (i) what was Semiotic for Peirce himself when he first formulated it, and (ii) what can be said about its origins in his earlier, pre-semiotic thought? In this account I concentrate on how Peirce's unpsychological view of logic upon which his Semiotic was found in 1865 has foundations in the earlier theory of the representation of the "unthought".
I argue that the formal model of representation Peirce used in order to deal with the problem of mind's relating to object it is uncapable to conceive, worked-out as an exception to otherwise psychological theory of representation, opens the way for latter unpsychological theory, because it might be parsimoniously applied even to those representation where psychological model is applicable, thus rendering the psychological account superflous in the whole.