Abstract
The objective of the second chapter, titled "Person as a personified unit of interests", is to explain why each and every person (in order to be considered a person under the law) must be granted "legal personhood" and, at the same time, also the capacity to "perform legal acts", whether independently or via a legal representative or curator. The reason why a human (an individual) , or even some other entity derived from a human in one way or the other, is granted a legal personhood lies in the fact that the legal order recognises and protects that person's interests and thus enables the same "person" to autonomously pursue those interests.
In a situation where that person is not capable of doing so because he or she lacks own reason and will, he/she is considered to lack legal capacity. The question of legal capacity, or lack thereof, thus in fact lies in the question as to whose reason and will are imputed to a specific person.
The applicable Czech law confirms this in Section 31 of the Civil Code, which stipulates that "[a]ny minor who has not yet acquired full legal capacity is presumed to be capable of making legal transactions which are, as to their nature, proportionate to the intellectual and volitional maturity of minors of his age." The above-cited provision confirms that, if a person who would normally lack legal capacity, is able to apply his reason and will, the law vests in such a person at least limited legal capacity. Where reason and will cannot be imputed because there are none, it is necessary to impute "someone else's" reason and will, replacing "own" reason and will.
A person lacking legal capacity differs from one that enjoys legal capacity in that it is imputed the reason and will of other persons who, when performing legal acts for the person lacking legal capacity, may not pursue their own interests, but must rather follow the interests of the person they represent. Therefore, a person can also be considered a personified unity of interests.