Abstract
This article analyses Jürgen Habermas' relation to religion. To this end, it focuses on the post-secular phase of this relation: that is, on the period in which Habermas conceives of religion as a partner in dialogue, and makes an appeal for secular reason to learn from religion.
In the article I formulate the thesis that Habermas is, in his relation to religion, ambivalent in more ways than one: on the one hand he speaks about the rationality of religion, on the other hand, there remain in his approach traces of the secularizing thesis which sees religion as irrational. On the one hand he is painfully aware of the deficiencies of secular reason, while on the other hand he rejects religiously-oriented philosophy and relies on the concept of translation, which is in many way inadequate.
The shift in attitude, making reason receptive towards religion, which is cultivated in Habermas' contemporary work, is treated, in this article, as inadequate, and a further shift in this direction is recommended.