Abstract
The article deals with the Enlightenment conception of freedom as propounded by Kant and as re-interpreted by Hegel. Although for Kant, the source of normativity is practical reason as embodied in the categorical imperative and good will, Hegel contends that this criterion removes the essence of action from the world into a subjective intention.
Against Kant, Hegel emphasizes that in focusing on the subjective side of action, we fail to understand that freedom is always realized in concert with others. In this sense, he emphasizes that there are social conditions that enable or disable free acting, and above all, one's freedom depends on the quantity of the freedom of others: The more there are free people, the more evolved the freedom is.
As essennially plural, freedom is conditioned by an institutional framework, the "syntax of objective thought." The author argues that due to this institutional dimension of freedom, the outcome of Hegel's philosophy is paradoxical. It is only as long as man is not free that he needs an explicit consciousness of freedom; once he or she finds himself or herself in a free society, i.e., in a society with institutionally secured basic freedoms, he need not maintain a vigilant sense of freedom.