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Normative significance of the rules governing interpretation in the Czech legislation

Publication at Faculty of Law |
2019

Abstract

In terms of the valid and effective Czech laws, it can be stated that the rules governing the procedure in interpreting a normative legal text can only be found in the Civil Code, especially in Section 2, but partially also in Sections 3, 10 and 13. However, in many cases, the legislator restricts the permissible extent of interpretative conclusions (especially with the help of legal definitions of the individual legal notions).

Interpretation must be performed within the constitutional limits determined by virtue of constitutional principles expressed in the Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms - a fact also relied upon by the valid Civil Code. It must be borne in mind in this respect that, in terms of interpretative procedure, Czech legal theorists will agree with one another solely on the order of interpretation methods.

Perhaps everyone will agree that the external form of a legal norm needs to be taken into account; a norm first has to be read and placed in a certain context, and only then is it possible to interpret it in terms of its purpose (whether current and objective, or that pursued by the historical legislature). However, this consensus ends once it comes to methods of interpretation, and the mutual disagreement is quite fundamental regarding the importance that should be attached to these individual methods.

The authors of this paper believe that a one-sided approach - preferring primarily either the text of law or its purpose - is very unlikely to prevail. According to the authors, a solution lies in differentiating between simple and hard cases, and thus between those who are authorised to interpret the primary object (the text of the law) and those who may also provide interpretation of the secondary object (the underlying values and principles).

As a rule, first-instance courts cannot classify a certain case as hard; in contrast, the supreme courts may - even in these cases - resort exceptionally also to "special" methods of interpretation that, besides the actual wording of a legal norm, also take into account the norm's purpose and the values that they are supposed to protect.