ollowing the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("the Char- ter") became a part of the primary law of the EU. Although one may expect intensified protection of funda- mental rights on the European continent, many scholars suggested otherwise, pointing to considerable limitations posed on the Charter's application.
This is especially the case of the so-called third generation rights, which have been left under the exclusive disposition of the Member States. The essay begins with drawing attention to the Charter's inherent limitations as interpreted by the CJEU.
The author then focuses on the general use of the Charter in the case law of Czech courts, and proceeds to the assessment of its (in)application in particular cases concerning social and economic rights in order to ex- amine the potential shift in the intensity of their protection. It is concluded that the evidence does not suggest any change in the analysed area after the Charter's incorporation into the primary law.