Abstract
In contemporary scientifical-philosophical discourse about consciousness we can identify the tendency to describe the world physicalistically, i.e. with the assumption that under certain conditions everything is reducible on the physical facts, and, therefore, it is empirically reportable. This thesis is also a starting point of phisicalistic theory of consciousness.
Neuroscientific research shows that in a certain degree mental states naturally supervene on brain states. But with the growing knowledge of physical facts about a brain we also see that this new knowledge is deviating physicalistic paradigm--p.ex. the question of the knowledge itself, which may probably be based on some neural constelation, but in its mere nature it is not empirically reportable, i.e. it seems not to be reducible on the physical.
The semiotic approach to knowledge may help to clarify why it is so, and, therefore, why humans are unique in their ability to operate with states that are, by nature, lacking the physical character.