Merleau-Ponty's Discovery of the Pre-objective Body and Its Consequences for Body-Oriented Disciplines
Abstract
This paper addresses the ontological status of the body in the context of bodily practices in body-oriented disciplines, such as sport training, dance, and physiotherapy. Following Descartes', Husserl's, and in particular Merleau-Ponty's interpretations of the body, it contends that the body cannot be considered merely as an object amongst other objects.
From the phenomenological perspective, one's own body is characterized by certain exceptionalities that distinguish it from other bodies that we experience. These exceptionalities of one's own body are described as (1) its permanent presence and perspectival anchoring, (2) its ability to sense both on its surface and in its interior, (3) its capacity to move itself in an immediate way.
First, it is shown how Merleau-Ponty employs his insights into the nature of these exceptionalities in order to accomplish an epistemological turn that has ontological implications: one's own body is not at first an object, but rather a being through which objects are possible for us. Then, the impact of Merleau-Ponty's epistemological turn (on our understanding of our engagement with our perceptual environment and with another's body in practical body-oriented disciplines) is clarified.
Finally, it is explained why, rather than treating one's own and the other's body merely as a physical entity or as a representation in the mind, we should approach it as an expression of bodily understanding and of the grasping of a situation. The development of this approach into a systematic framework promises a more adequate and appropriate practice of body-oriented disciplines.