Abstract
This paper explores motives to include significant safeguards into the new Hungarian constitution. The first part describes the rise of Fidesz and its electoral victory in 2010, including more systematic interpretation concerning the origins of this large party system shift.
The second part probes relevant theories of constitutional entrenchment and finds that there is no fundamental explanation why the constitution is drafted like it is, since the most normative and empirical theories of constitutional fortification wonder how to protect a minority. When it comes to fortified majority, a much less probed phenomenon, insurance theory and hegemony preservation thesis appear to provide some help.
Yet in the end, both of these theories happen to be unable to explain Hungarian constitutional politics before 2010, but not after that. In conclusion, the paper disagrees with the most of present scholarship, which is considering the new Hungarian constitution to be formally within EU mainstream, while expressing concerns about Viktor Orbán's illiberal project behind it.
In contrast, I think the constitution itself is sloppily drafted, with a potential to create a dangerous crisis after Orbán's eventual demise.