Abstract
Mimicry is often cited as a compelling demonstration of the power of natural selection. By adopting signs of a protected model, mimics usually gain a reproductive advantage by minimising the likelihood of being preyed upon.
Yet while natural selection plays a role in the evolution of mimicry, it can be doubted whether it fully explains it. Mimicry is mediated by the emergence of formally analogous patterns (visual, olfactory, or acoustic) between unrelated organisms and by the fact that these patterns are meaningfully perceived as similar.
The perception of similarity is always perceiver-dependent. Similarities between for instance colours are psychophysical phenomena, and their existence is conditioned by an intimate interdependence between perceivers and perceptible reality.
In this sense, mimicry is by its very nature dualistic. The analogy in form needed to establish a mimicry does not emerge out of the blue.
It depends on the ecological context and the morphogenetic potential of a species. In our proposal, we take into account both the developmental generators of formally analogous structures and the perceptual and cognitive processes that lead to the emergence of mimicry.
We show that some of the rather controversial and nowadays largely neglected ideas found in non-Anglo-Saxon literature on mimicry (e.g. writings by Th. Eimer, F.
Heikertinger, or N. Vavilov) deserve closer attention.
We suggest that the diversity of mimicry types is due to differences in variational properties of form-generating and perceptual systems among diverse groups of organisms. We also anticipate that processes studied within social psychology and emotion research (such as the formation of a first impression or activation of the fear module) probably take place, at least in a simplified form, also in non-human animals.
Finally, we argue that these meaning-attributive processes underlie the functionality of mimicry.