Abstract
We can hear silence because silence, an absence of sound, causes our hearing of it. Advocating this position, Roy Sorensen puts to use his own theory of the direct perception of absences.
Sorensen's theory, which relies on two theories of perception (the causal theory of perception and the theory of non-epistemic perception), certainly has its appeal. However, it also has its problematic aspects.
On my reading, a weak point of his theory is that it does not provide a criterion for the identification of what exactly we hear. By elaborating this objection in detail, I intend to demonstrate that Sorensen's theory (i) does not concern direct (non-epistemic) perception, and (ii) does not show that silence is causally efficient.
Therefore, (iii) it fails to show that silence is the genuine negative object of hearing. I conclude by giving two further reasons for why the ontology that underpins Sorensen's theory should not be endorsed.