Abstract
The article provides a basic analysis of constitutional instruments of emergency government in the Czech Republic; dominant attention is paid to the changes that have occurred in this area in recent decades, especially in connection with the adoption and interpretation of the Constitutional Act on the Security of the Czech Republic. However, the establishing of several states of emergency by this constitutional act shows several serious shortcomings, such as difficulties in interpreting the reasons for declaring the State of Emergency or the factual impossibility of declaring the State of National Threat.
Finally, the paper is devoted to pointing out the possible ways that could be used in the future events that pose a major threat to the security of the state, in a situation where it is not possible to declare the State of National Threat (or the State of War) and no constitutional change will be made. Constitutional theory offers some other solutions; for their diversity, the article is limited to examples of some legal models of interim nature (changing the interpretation of the State of Emergency, adopting ad hoc legislation using a State of Legislative Emergency, the doctrine of inherent powers).
However, not only these but also other emergency response models may present different dangers for the character of the Czech constitutional regime.