Abstract
The article attempts to discover, in Levinas' early philosophy, the first indications of what by his later writings would become a fully developed, ethical conception of being-for-the other. The first texts, which were in large measure shaped by Heidegger's fundamental ontology, place the phenomenon of impersonal being - il y a (there is) - into the forefront.
We show that, besides a purely ontological view, we can in Levinas' postulation of the concept identify intentions that are both existential and ethical. The mood of horror, resulting from the subject's experience with il y a, throws individual consciousness into an existential upheaval, opening up the possibility for an ethical turn.
This existential-ethical prism forms, first of all, a comprehensive narrative, combining Levinas' early ontological thinking with the ethical concept that he developed in his late work and, secondly, points to a significant formative function of moods in existential phenomenology. Above all, the mood of horror is showing itself to be a way to negatively serve and motivate ethical attitudes.