Abstract
Decision making of Czech courts and administrative authorities is usually subjected to more than one instance of review. In this process, we can identify a relation between the "lower" and "higher" instance.
Each of them uses certain criteria, a certain frame of reference, for its decision making. It can be expected from a rational law of review that lower instances can (and must) adjudge so that their decisions are not vacated.
And vice versa, if a decision has been quashed, it means that the body delivering the decision erred and should have made a different decision. The article points at several cases where this requirement is not fulfilled exactly because the lower and higher instances are guided by diverging criteria.
It also shows that praxis reacts to such cases, which the lawgiver does not want to solve, with an effort to converge the colliding frames of reference. This is primarily manifested by the lower instance's frame of reference being influenced by a dissimilar frame of reference of its review.
Thus, the synthesis connects seemingly dissimilar situations, where analogous thought processes can be applied though. In most cases, this actually occurs; where it does not, the article can be a helpful inspiration.