Abstrakt
The opening study to the special issue which addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke's initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke.
We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the Anglophone debates on personal identity were initially formed by the persistence question and the characterization question, the "Continental" tradition included remarkably intense debates on the individual or the self as being unique or "concrete," deeply temporal and (as claimed by some philosophers, like Sartre and Foucault) unable to have any identity, if not one externally imposed.
We describe the Continental line of thinking about the "self" as a reply and an adjustment to the post-Lockean "personal identity" question (as suggested by thinkers such as MacIntyre, Ricoeur and Taylor). These observations constitute the backdrop for our presentation of phenomenological approaches to personal identity.
These approaches run along three lines: (a) debates on the layers of the self, starting from embodiment and the minimal self and running all the way to the full-fledged concept of person; (b) questions of temporal becoming, change and stability, as illustrated, for instance, by aging or transformative life-experiences; and (c) the constitution of identity in the social, institutional, and normative space. The introduction thus establishes a structure for locating and connecting the different contributions in our special issue, which, as an ensemble, represent a strong and differentiated contribution to the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological perspective.