Abstract
Starting from a very specific cut-out that privileges the constitution question, this paper intends to point out the argumentative pillars of what we can consider to be the "meontic phenomenology project", which Fink developed both in dialogue and in confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology, of whom he was the last assistant and main collaborator. The intention is thus to show how the question about constitution - or, in the formulation immortalized by French phenomenology, "the problem of the origin of the world" - has been outlined in Presentification and Image and appears more clearly in the most important work of that period, IV.
Cartesian Meditation, but - perhaps even more decisively for the French reception of Husserlian phenomenology in general - in the famous article published in 1933 in the Kant-Studien as well. Finally, I argue that, in light of the problem of constitution/origin of the world, Fink's phenomenology shall be better understood by the "meontic" predicate instead of "transcendental", once that Fink resist the classical Husserlian definition of a "transcendental phenomenology."