Abstract
The following article provides an interpretation of the structure ofcourage in Plato'sLaches,MenoandProtagoras. I argue that these dialoguespresent courage (ἀνδρεία) in the soul according to the same scheme: that there is anormatively neutral psychic state which is informed by the knowledge of good andevil.
The knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which informs this normatively neutral psychicstate is called practical wisdom (which Plato refers to as φρόνησιςor sometimes σοφία). This interpretation seems to negate the claim that virtue is knowledge.
Iwill show, however, that this is not a contradiction and that virtue is in factknowledge, despite the complex moral psychology of courage. Finally, I will arguethat the conception of courage in the Republicaddresses some of the problemsposed by the discussion of courage in the above-mentioned dialogues.