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Personal Uniqueness and Events

Publikace na Filozofická fakulta |
2021

Tento text není v aktuálním jazyce dostupný. Zobrazuje se verze "en".Abstrakt

In contrast to Anglophone debates on personal identity initially formed by John Locke's investigation of personal identity in the sense of personal continuity or persistence through time, the Continental tradition focuses on what constitutes ipseity (ipséité, Selbstsein, selfhood) in the sense of individuality or uniqueness of the human being "constituted" by its continuous transformation through changing experience. In this study, I claim that contemporary phenomenological research in France-especially the "phenomenology of the event" as represented by Henri Maldiney and Claude Romano-contributes to this Continental discussion in a significant way: it formulates the conditions of personal uniqueness or distinctiveness with regard to other persons, conditions not to be found in Heidegger's existential conception of selfhood in Being and Time.

More precisely, Maldiney and Romano allow us to answer the principal questions of this study: In what does the personal uniqueness consist? What exactly individualizes the first-person selfhood disclosed in Dasein's relation to death? In my three-stage analysis, I first deal with Heidegger's conception of selfhood in Being and Time and its limits with respect to the question of personal uniqueness. Next, I analyse Maldiney's conception of "eventful selfhood" in which he "completes" Heidegger's conception of selfhood by describing Dasein's openness to ontical, and yet fully authentic events.

Finally, I develop the argumentation by presenting Romano's even more radical conception of the "happening subjectivity" (advenant), which allows us to return to the second major feature of personal identity: personal persistence. Nonetheless, I conclude that the connection between personal uniqueness and persistence is not sufficiently examined in the phenomenology of the event, which opens the path towards another related inquiry into the following problem: What is the proper subjective dimension or the "underlying thing" (ὑποκείμενον) in the background of personal persistence which somehow resists events?