The aim of the paper is to show the possibilities and limits of the comparison of Anglo-Saxon and European continental legal cultures. In the work, it is clarified the content of the principle of comparability.
Furthermore, the different historical foundations of both systems are discussed and the role of history for macrocomparative legal analysis is emphasized.. The role of general philosophy in the typification of legal cultures is highlighted as well.
The current dialogue between contemporary analytical and continental philosophies is reflected in the analysis of the typical way of legal thinking in the observed legal cultures. The analysis is therefore based on the application of elements of general culture to the culture of the legal system.
The possibilities of such an application are demonstrated in the analysis of the way of interpretation of normative legal acts in both cultures. The similarities and differences of the methodology of interpretation of law in the diachronic perspective are also analysed.
It is argued that the historical differences between Anglo-Saxon and European continental legal cultures concern not only private law but also public law, as they are based on a more general thought base typical of each culture. Methodologically, the work is based on sociological and historical forms of comparison.