Abstract
Questioning 'concerning' means considering 'concerning' as an object asking for its characters (1868, W2: 215). What enables us to consider 'concerning' as an object? Under which conditions can we ascribe some characters to 'concerning' as an object? What are these characters? To raise the question on 'concerning,' i.e., consider it as an object, we must firstly elaborate on it as a sign since the questions above are ipso facto questions on sign references of 'concerning.' This paper focuses on the relation between the object of a sign and the sign of an object, whereas the later necessarily precedes the former, and on the consequences this conception has--questions concerning 'concerning', i.e., questions concerning the character of signs in their relation to objects are the only questions we can ask.
Therefore, we do not have objects as such, we do only concern them, and hence, we lack the faculty of intuition.