Penal populism has repeatedly been described as influencing penal policies, with harsh penal practices presented as evidence of its influence. However, little attention has yet been paid to its role in the development of penal policies in post-authoritarian countries, which generally have large prison populations.
Some minimal research has suggested that Central European countries were driven by penal nationalism following the 1989 revolutions. I examine this claim for the Czech Republic, using Garland (2013)'s framework of the five dimensions of a penal state.
My analysis of political manifestoes shows that Czech politicians did not employ "law and order" rhetoric. The country's penal reforms were led by lenient penal elites.
Nevertheless, a lack of analysis, coordination and sufficient funding resulted in a failure to properly identify or tackle the causes of the country's high imprisonment rate. Even though it gradually became more difficult to impose prison sentences, insufficient attention was paid to the length of the sentences Czech prisoners were serving.
The large Czech prison population thus seems to be the result of state actors' negligence, but not of penal populism nor of penal nationalism.