The destiny of man after the transcendent withdrawal of God in Schelling's Freiheitsschrift (1809) (1775-1854
Abstract
In this work we analyse the anthropological consequences of the Schellinguian metaphysical and cosmological model of explanation that, from 1809 onwards, confers on the world and on man, under the categories of finitude, evil and human freedom, a new central role that is unmarked of his previous monistic and immanent thought (1801-1804). The hypothesis that we defend consists of affirming that the criticisms of the notions of immanence and identity based on the concepts of separation (Zertrennung, Scheidung) and ground (Grund) place man in a privileged role to continue in human history, the work of freedom, the process initiated by God with the creation of nature.
However, this withdrawal of God with respect to the destiny of the world, which allows the human individual to take control of his destiny and to assume all his metaphysical and moral responsibility, places us in front of the problematic scenario of the loss of the universality and of atheism that link our author to contemporary philosophical traditions. This is the essential difference, then, between God and man, or as we shall see, between the God who is and the God who becomes.