Difficulties of any immanent interpretation of the relationship between human freedom and God in Schelling's Freiheitsschrift
Abstrakt
In this chapter I will develop a series of criticisms of the notions of immanence and pantheism, as I think they can be inferred from an anti-Spinozist reading of Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. In order to articulate these interpretive goals, I divide this study into three parts.
In the first place, I analyze (1) the theoretical framework in which the Schellingian discussion on Spinozism and pantheism is inserted towards the end of the 18th century. This is that of the idealism of Kant and Fichte, albeit highly modified.
Secondly, I undertake (2) a reconstruction of the internal argumentation of the 1809 writing, paying special attention to the third critique of the notion of immanence that is carried out with the treatment of evil. In this context I also review, although with less emphasis, the other two criticisms, which deal with a conception of identity as different from undifferentiated equality, and the refutation of realist ontology as a variant to understand the link mentioned, by pantheism, in the proposition that things are "in God." Finally, I present (3) what we can consider a reversal of the criticism of anthropomorphism leveled against Schelling.
At the end of the work, I hope to show that, at various points, Schelling's approach of 1809 flirts with a critique of immanence, although without fully developing it and, consequently, it conveys new forms of dualism and transcendence, but that should not be interpreted under its traditional negative prism.